Can the IRS Read Your Email?

IRS_logoThe IRS thinks that they can.

The IRS maintains that its agents can read taxpayers’ emails, texts, and other private electronic communications without a warrant according to a story by Brendan Sasso in The Hill. According to the story, the IRS has maintained that taxpayers “do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such communications.”

The report is based on documents acquired in a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the American Civil Liberties Union.

Read the story here:
IRS: We can read emails without warrant

Hat tip: Beau Howard

New York’s Highest Court Affirms Constitutionality of Click-Through Nexus

500px-Seal_of_the_New_York_Court_of_Appeals.svgClick-through nexus is a well-known term in the world of sales and use tax. It refers to the proposition that an internet vendor may be required to collect and remit sales tax on sales that originate from links placed on the websites of independent affiliates if that affiliate has nexus with the taxing jurisdiction. It is also known as affiliate nexus but may be most commonly known as the “Amazon tax” or “internet tax.”

Here’s how it works. Large internet retailers like Amazon.com and Overstock.com often maintain a physical presence in only a handful of jurisdictions thereby limiting their obligation to collect and remit sales tax on sales in those states where they have no physical presence. These large internet retailers also allow independent websites to enter into affiliate sales agreements. The independent website agrees to put a link to the retailer on their website. In return, the independent website receives a commission on sales that originate from the link on their site. The commission is triggered when the customer “clicks through” the link on the independent website to make a purchase on the large retailer’s website. The tax issue is whether the physical presence of the independent website in a particular state can be attributed to the larger company for sales tax collection purposes.

New York was one of the first states to enact a statute creating a sales tax obligation based on click-through nexus. In 2008, New York amended the definition of “vendor” for sales tax purposes to include referring website links:

a person making sales of tangible personal property of services taxable under this article (‘seller’) shall be presumed to be soliciting business through an independent contractor or other representative if the seller enters into an agreement with a resident of this state under which the resident, for a commission or other consideration, directly or indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link on an internet website or otherwise, to the seller, if the cumulative gross receipts from sales by the seller to customers in the state who are referred to the seller by all residents with this type of agreement with the seller is in excess of ten thousand dollars during the preceding four quarterly periods. Tax Law § 1101(b)(8)(vi)

The amendment created a presumption that New York residents who received commissions from sales generated by website referral links were soliciting business in the state on behalf of the party who paid the commission. Shortly after the statute was amended, the Department of Taxation and Finance (DTF) issued guidance indicating that placing a link to another website on a website owned by a resident would not trigger the statutory presumption because it was “mere advertising.” However, if the link generated sales commissions for the resident owner of the independent website, then the link would not be considered mere advertising and the sale would be subject to sales tax.

Amazon and Overstock each filed suit arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face (i.e., as written) and as applied under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The New York Supreme Court (New York’s trial court) granted DTF’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action in both cases. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissals on the facial challenges but reinstated the as-applied challenges, calling for further discovery. The parties stipulated to the discontinuance of the as-applied constitutional challenges to set the stage for the New York Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) to review the merits of their facial challenge. The Amazon and Overstock cases were consolidated for consideration by the high court.

Facial constitutional challenges face a high hurdle and this case followed in suit. The Commerce Clause question came down to whether New York’s statute satisfies the “substantial nexus” test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc, v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 314 (1992). Most observers would note that the Complete Auto test applies to income taxes and the Quill test applies to sales and use taxes. The New York court did not make such a distinction. This is notable because the sales tax test under Quill requires a physical presence in the taxing jurisdiction to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement.

The Court of Appeals distinguished Quill‘s physical presence requirement based on its own jurisprudence. Citing its opinion in Matter of Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 86 N.Y.2d 165 (1995), the high court noted that

although an in-state physical presence is necessary, it “need not be substantial. Rather, it must be demonstrably more than a ‘slightest presence'”. The presence requirement will be satisfied if economic activities are performed in New York by the seller’s employees or on its behalf. [internal citations omitted]

The court explained that “the world has changed dramatically in the last two decades” and expounded on the parallels between the mail order business (Quill) and online retail (Amazon and Overstock). In affirming the constitutionality of the New York statute under the Commerce Clause, the Court of Appeals held that

Viewed in this manner the statute plainly satisfies the substantial nexus requirement. Active, in-state solicitation that produces a significant amount of revenue qualifies as “demonstrably more than a ‘slightest presence'” under Orvis.

The Court of Appeals’ analysis of the Due Process Clause was more direct. It affirmed the statutory presumption that resident affiliates will solicit local sales by reaching “out to their New York friends, relatives and other local individuals” was rationally related to the facts proved and the facts presumed.

The opinion of the court included a dissent from Judge Robert S. Smith who observed that the New York statute “tries to turn advertising media into an in-state sales force through presumption.” The consequence, in Judge Smith’s view, “would be to nullify the rule that advertising in in-state media is not the equivalent of physical presence.” The dissent concluded that the statute should be held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.

Some observers may question whether the New Court of Appeals has skirted Quill’s physical presence standard with this decision. In all events, click-through nexus is the law of the land in New York. Whether the parties will seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court remains to be seen.

Read the opinion here:
Overstock v. New York Taxation and Finance

4th Circuit: District Court Abused Discretion by Allowing Evidence of CPA’s Personal Tax Situation in Tax Shelter Promoter Case

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated portions of a jury’s findings, including imposition of a $2.6 million penalty, because the District Court allowed the introduction of evidence of the defendant CPA’s personal tax situation (he didn’t file returns) during the penalty phase of the trial.

The Fourth Circuit held that the District Court abused its discretion by permitting the evidence into the record over the defendant’s objection. The Court of Appeals further held that the personal tax information was not relevant to the tax shelter promotion penalty in question and the effect of allowing it into evidence was highly prejudicial. The lower court’s error was not harmless.

The appellate court concluded that the evidence “bears all the indicia of garden-variety “bad acts” evidence with no other purpose than to emotionally inflame the jury against the defendant.”

Read the opinion here:
Nagy v. U.S., No. 10-2072 (4th Cir. Mar. 29, 2013)

Two Weeks Left to File 2009 FICA Refund Claims for Severance Payments

url2The deadline for filing 2009 FICA refund claims based on U.S. v. Quality Stores, Inc. is fast approaching. Corporate taxpayers who experienced layoffs, reductions in force, and/or facility closures in 2009 or thereafter may file a protective refund claim for FICA taxes withheld from severance payments made to involuntarily terminated employees. Taxpayers have until April 15, 2013, to file a protective refund claim for all four quarters filed in 2009.

The refund claims are predicated on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in U.S. v. Quality Stores, Inc., previously reported here, which held that certain severance payments are not subject to FICA withholding. The ruling specifically applies to taxpayers in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee (the states within the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit) but taxpayers across the country have been filing claims to protect their right to potential refunds.

The government is still considering whether to challenge the decision in the United States Supreme Court. The original deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari was April 4, 2013, but last week the Supreme Court granted the government’s request for a 30-day extension. Those waiting to see if government would seek the high court’s review before filing a protective claim will now have to make a decision without that knowledge. The government’s deadline for filing a petition is May 3, 2013.

Today: Supreme Court to Hear Arguments in DOMA Tax Case

Seal_of_the_United_States_Supreme_Court.svgToday, the United States Supreme Court will hear arguments about the Constitutional rights of homosexual couples courtesy of the Internal Revenue Code.

The Court may rule on a variety of grounds in United States v. Windsor including standing (was the couple’s marriage recognized under New York law) and the proper Constitutional standard (does Intermediate Scrutiny apply to homosexuals) but the case started with a tax return.

Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer were New York residents and a couple for over 40 years. In 2007, they were married in Canada where same-sex marriage was legal. Upon Thea’s death, Edie filed a federal estate tax return, Form 706. Thea’s estate paid $363,053 in federal estate taxes because she was not eligible for the unlimited marital deduction under IRC §2056(a) – a benefit routinely applied to married couples of different sexes. Edie filed a claim for refund of the estate taxes paid. When that claim for refund was denied she filed suit in federal district court.

The refund denial was reversed by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Read opinions published in those cases here and here.

Whether not the Supreme Court issues a sweeping or narrow opinion on the rights of homosexuals, there is little question that the tax code touches everyone. After all, that’s where this case started.

U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Tax Penalty Case

us-supreme-courtThe Supreme Court has granted the government’s petition for certiorari in United States v. Woods, No. 12-562. The high court will decide whether the IRC §6662 overstatement penalty applies to underpayments of tax that are “attributable to an overstatement of basis” when the basis has been disallowed because the transactions that established the basis lacked economic substance.

The Court also asked the parties to brief an additional issue related to the procedural history of the case. Specifically, the Court is interested in whether the district court had jurisdiction under IRC §6226 to consider the substantial valuation misstatement penalty. This question, which arises under the procedural guidelines that govern large partnerships in TEFRA, has been raised in many cases over the course of the last decade. The heart of the matter is what issues are appropriate for resolution in a partner-level proceeding and which should be resolved at the partnership level.

Read the court’s order here:
12-562 U.S. v. Woods

Tax Court: Horse Breeding Activity Not Motivated By Profit, Losses Disallowed

Horse FarmIn a memorandum opinion, the Tax Court has held that a taxpayer’s 17 years of losses in the horse-breeding business was not an activity motivated by profit under IRC §183. The taxpayer’s deductions attributable to the activity were disallowed and a substantial underpayment penalty was imposed.

Read the opinion here:
Dodds v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-76

Tax Court: Sole Proprietor’s Sub-contractors are Employees

The taxpayer in Kurek v. Commissioner was a sole proprietor in the business of home renovations. He reported his business income on Schedule C and hired approximately 30 workers to assist him on various projects. He did not: issue Forms 1099 or W-2 to any of the workers, offer employee benefits, carry unemployment insurance or workers compensation insurance. An IRS examination determined that the workers were employees for FICA, FUTA and federal income tax withholding purposes. Mr. Kurek petitioned the Tax Court.

Whether a worker is classified as an employee or independent contractor is a facts and circumstances test based on a variety of factors. The determinative question, however, is whether the employer has the right to control and direct the worker, even if he did not actually do so.

Mr. Kurek had some pretty good facts in his favor: None of the workers worked full-time; each worker was paid on a project-by-project basis; each worker set his own hours and schedule; each worker used his own tools; workers could work for other construction groups; and workers were replaced if they failed to meet a deadline. All of these facts weigh in favor of independent contactor status.

However, the Tax Court found otherwise. The Court emphasized that the taxpayer (1) exercised ultimate authority over the workers as to their job responsibilities, (2) approved the quality of their work, and (3) paid them weekly rather than at the end of the project. It also considered the fact that only the taxpayer communicated with the homeowners, and that he alone was responsible for the success or failure of the projects. It gave considerably less weight to the factors in favor of independent contractor status and concluded that the workers should be classified as employees because the taxpayer failed to prove that he did not control them.

The taxpayer also did not qualify for Section 530 relief because he did not file a Form 1099 for any of the workers.

Read the opinion here:
Kurek v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2013-64

Petition for Writ of Certiorari Filed in Historic Boardwalk Hall Tax Credit Case

us-supreme-courtThe taxpayers in Historic Boardwalk Hall are seeking review in the United States Supreme Court. As reported here last summer, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court and denied the public/private partnership between the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority (“NJSEA”) and Pitney Bowes the benefit of historic rehabilitation tax credits because the two parties were not bona fide partners.

The petition faces an uphill battle to gain a hearing at the Supreme Court. There is no split in the Circuit Courts of Appeal on this issue and the high court seems reluctant to tackle tax matters without that prompt. The petition rightly argues that this is the first case “where the Internal Revenue Service has made a broad based challenge to the allocation of Congressionally-sanctioned federal historic rehabilitation tax credits by a partnership to a partner.” The public policy implications of the Third Circuit’s decision are broad and the impact has already been felt in the historic rehabilitation context and beyond. Many parties will be watching to see what happens with this petition.

Read the petition for writ of certiorari here:
Historic Boardwalk Hall Petition for Writ of Certiorari