9th Circuit Reverses the Tax Court in Altera

In a case involving a who’s who’s of big law tax litigators and amici briefs from several well known international companies, a split panel of the 9th Circuit has reversed the Tax Court in Altera Corp. v. Commissioner. The two judge majority held that the IRS’s Section 482 cost-sharing regulations withstand scrutiny under general administrative law principles and are entitled to Chevron deference. The Tax Court decision invalidating those regulations as arbitrary and capricious is reversed.

Read the majority opinion and dissent here: Altera Corp. v. Commissioner.

Navel Gazing Micro Captive Insurance Company Denied Deductions

Yesterday the Tax Court issued a long-anticipated opinion on a fully-litigated micro-captive insurance company. Micro-captive insurance companies have long been a popular means of self-insuring for closely-held businesses but recently have come under additional scrutiny by the IRS. This case long preceded the IRS’s formal announcement focusing on micro-captive companies and was supported on brief by the Self-Insurance Institute of America, Inc.

Photo by Gregg Taveres

Micro-captive insurance companies are specifically provided for under IRC Section 831(b) but, as demonstrated by the Court’s opinion, they must meet certain factual criteria to maintain that preferred tax status. In a detailed and precedential division opinion authored by Judge Holmes, the Tax Court found that the insurance company formed by business owners Benyamin and Orna Avrahami was not operated like an insurance company, issued policies with unclear and contradictory terms, and charged wholly unreasonable premiums. Because the company was not an insurance company as required by section 831(b), its election to be treated as a micro-captive insurance company was invalid. As such, the premiums paid to the company by the Avrahamis were not deductible business expenses.

The Avrahamis also owned an entity called Belly Button Center which received funds from their insurance company and made loans to them personally. After its “omphaloskeptical review” the IRS challenged the validity of the loans alleging that they were a sham. The Court declined to reach that conclusion but did treat a little less than $300,000 of the $1.5 million transferred between the related parties as taxable dividends.

Finally, the Court considered whether negligence penalties applied to the Avrahamis. Based in part on the fact that this was a case of first impression with regard to micro-captive insurance, the Court found that the taxpayers had reasonable cause for the position taken on the returns and thus avoided penalties on the disallowed insurance premiums. The Court did, however, impose penalties on the portion of the loan treated as a dividend and another dividend of $200,000 that the taxpayers failed to report on their return.

Read the entire opinion here: Avrahami.

Substantial Compliance Returns for the Charitable Contribution of Real Property

pni0802clayexploreIn a division opinion, the U.S. Tax Court reestablished the prospect of substantial compliance for taxpayers who claim charitable contribution deductions that require an appraisal. Three partners in a LLC sold property to Arizona’s Maricopa Flood Control District (you may have heard of Maricopa here) for less than fair market value. After obtaining two separate appraisals, the taxpayers claimed a charitable contribution on the difference between the lesser of the two valuations and the sale price.

The IRS disallowed the deductions on the grounds that: the appraiser was not qualified; there was not a detailed description of the property; there was no statement that the appraisal was for income tax purposes; the valuation date was not the date of the contribution; and the appraisers’ definition of fair market value did not match that of the regulations. The IRS also argued that the value of the property was less than the sales price.

The government lost on every count. The court rejected the IRS’s nit pick approach to each of the appraisal documentation requirements – including the government’s argument that the Form 8283 did not include the signatures of both appraisers even though the form only has one signature line for an appraiser. The Court found that the difference of 11 to 21 days between the valuation date and the contribution date should not matter without “any significant event that would obviously affect the value of the property.” The Court also found that there are no magic words to fulfill the requirement that the appraisal state that it is for income tax purposes and the inclusion of the statement “for filing with the IRS” with the appraisal constituted substantial compliance with the regulation. With regard to each alleged violation of the charitable contribution regulations, the Court found that the taxpayers’ were in substantial compliance.

Finally, the Court rejected the valuation by the government’s expert which was based on “unreasonable assumptions” and adopted the appraisal presented by the taxpayers’ expert at trial (which was more than claimed on the original returns).

Read the opinion here: Cave Buttes, LLC v. Commissioner

IRS issues AOD on Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Debt Limits

View More: http://aimeeburchard.pass.us/tinyhomeIf you happened to read our article on individual debt limitations for the home mortgage interest deduction, you may be interested to know that the IRS issued an Acquiescence on Decision last week to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Voss v. Commissioner, 796 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2015).

IRS AOD 2016-02

Anyone for Tennis? Technical Foot Faults & the Conservation Easement Tax Deduction

TennisBallOnCourtWe just wrapped up the 2016 Wimbledon fortnight. Andy Murray took the Men’s bracket while the Williams sisters are once again making news.

We found the rules that govern the grass courts can be instructive in understanding the outcome of several recent conservation easement tax cases. We put together our thoughts for the new issue of the Bloomberg BNA Real Estate Journal. Most of the article discusses the surprising decisions being reached by the courts but we do manage to reference the ITF, the USTA, Serena Williams and one of Eric Clapton’s old bands.

You can see the article here: Anyone for Tennis? Technical Foot Faults & the Conservation Easement Tax Deduction

Understanding the Conservation Easement Tax Deduction (or Strawberry Fields Forever)

We’ve covered developments in the litigation of conversation and facade easement cases here for some time now.  We’ve recently taken that experience, added a little historical perspective, and put it together for an article in the Federal Lawyer.  (Yes, we mention the Beatles too).

Check it out here:  Understanding the Conservation Easement Tax Deduction (or Strawberry Fields Forever)

Through a Glass Darkly: Sophy, Voss and Interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code

We’ve been away from the blog for a bit while we have focused our efforts on more traditional publications. If you’re up for an article about the home mortgage interest deduction that includes references to the bible, the Rolling Stones, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Long Beach Island and Josh Ritter, then you might like what we recently published in BNA Tax Management Memorandum.

Download a copy here: Through a Glass Darkly: Sophy, Voss and Interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code 

Marijuana Dispensary’s Deductions go Up in Smoke

Medical-Marijuana-SymbolIn an opinion that would make Willie Nelson shake his head, the Tax Court held that a taxpayer was not entitled to deduct business expenses related to his “Health Care” business (read: medical marijuana dispensary).  The Court also disallowed the taxpayer’s cost of goods sold (COGS) and casualty loss for items seized during the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) raid of his dispensary in 2007.

The taxpayer resided in California and owned two medical marijuana dispensaries in 2007 operating under the name Alternative Herbal Health Services (“AHHS”).  AHHS sold various strands of marijuana, pre-rolled marijuana joints, and edible food items prepared with marijuana.  It did not sell any pipes, papers, or vaporizers, however they were made available to customers to medicate on site.  AHHS provided several educational activities to its customers at no charge including “loading, grinding, and packing marijuana for customers’ use of bongs, pipes and vaporizers.”  On January 11, 2007 the DEA searched the taxpayer’s dispensary in West Hollywood and seized marijuana, food items suspected to contain marijuana, and marijuana plants.

The taxpayer had a very short record retention policy, as his typical practice was to shred all sales and inventory records at the end of the day or by the next day.  When it came time to prepare his 2007 tax return, the taxpayer gave the numbers to his attorney who then gave them to his tax return preparer.  The Schedule C for his 2007 tax return reported a “Health Care” business with $1,700,000 in gross receipts and $1,429,614 in COGS and $194,094 in expenses.  The taxpayer included $600,000 attributable to the value of the marijuana seized by the DEA in his gross receipts and COGS entries for 2007.  All of the gross receipts and expenses reported on the taxpayer’s 2007 return were from the sale or expenses associated with AHHS’s marijuana or marijuana edibles.  After three amended answers, the IRS asserted a tax deficiency of $1,047,743 and assessed a $209,549 accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for the 2007 tax year.

Under IRC § 280E a taxpayer may not deduct any amount paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business if such trade or business consists of trafficking controlled substances which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any state in which the trade or business is conducted.  The Court relied on its own decision in Californians Helping To Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. (CHAMP) v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 173 (2007) and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) to determine that the taxpayer was trafficking in a controlled substance within the meaning of IRC § 280E.

However, Judge Goeke distinguished this case from CHAMP, where a potion of the taxpayer’s operating expenses were allowed because the taxpayer’s activities included those unrelated to the sale or distribution of marijuana.  In this case, the taxpayer provided no evidence that AHHS sold any non-marijuana-related items.

The Court also disallowed the taxpayer’s IRC § 165 casualty loss deduction and denied his characterization of the marijuana seized by the DEA as COGS in 2007.  The Court found that characterizing the marijuana seized by the DEA as COGS was difficult the taxpayer’s record retention policy left little substantiation for the value of items seized.  Even if he had been able to provide substantiation the product could not be considered COGS because was confiscated and, in fact, was not sold.  When the smoke cleared, Jude Goeke unsurprisingly upheld the accuracy-related penalty under IRC § 6662(a).

Read the full opinion here: Beck v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-149.

 

Timing is Everything in Easement Donations, or Is It?

“There is a tide in the affairs of men which when taken at the flood leads on to fortune.”

William Shakespeare

Shakespeare understood the importance of timing to success. Apparently, the Tax Court holds a similar view when it comes to charitable donations of conservation easements.

life_is_all_about_timing_481189800This is our third post on the Tax Court’s opinion in Bosque Canyon Ranch. The memorandum decision isn’t necessarily an important case; it didn’t establish any new precedents for the Court. However, there is quite a bit about modern conservation easements packed into a fairly short opinion, which gives us an opportunity to unpack some of what is there.

Today, we look at the Court’s conclusion that the property transfers between the two Bosque Canyon limited partnerships and their partners were disguised sales. (Click here for a more detailed case summary.)

A transfer of partnership property to a partner within two years of a cash (or other) contribution by that partner is presumed to be a disguised sale under IRC §707. The Bosque Canyon partnerships received cash and transferred property to partners within a two year window. That timing is not in question.

The presumption in IRC §707 may be refuted by facts and circumstances showing that the transfer did not constitute a sale. Treas. Reg. §1.707-3(b)(2) suggests 10 circumstances when a sale might be present. The Court identified five of those factors in its opinion.

  • the timing and amount of the distributions to the limited partners were determinable with reasonable certainty at the time the partnerships accepted the limited partners’ payments;
  • the limited partners had legally enforceable rights, pursuant to the LP agreements, to receive their Homesite parcels and the appurtenant rights;
  • the transactions effectuated exchanges of the benefits and burdens of ownership relating to the Homesite parcels;
  • the distributions to the partners were disproportionately large in relation to the limited partners’ interests in partnership profits; and
  • the limited partners received their Homesite parcels in fee simple without an obligation to return them to the partnerships.

When the transfers between the partnership and partners are not simultaneous, an additional rule provides that a disguised sale occurs only if “the subsequent transfer is not dependent on the entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations.” Treas. Reg. §1.707-3(b)(1)(ii). The timing of the transfers was not in dispute either. They were not simultaneous.

The timing issue, however, came in the context of entrepreneurial risk. The taxpayers argued that the limited partners’ contributions would be at risk if the anticipated conservation easements were not granted. The Court rejected this argument based on the timing of the easement grants. Unfortunately, the conservation easements for both partnerships were granted before the limited partnership agreements were executed. The Court found that the payments were not subject to the entrepreneurial risks of the partnership because the easements were secured before the partnerships were formed. In the case of Bosque Canyon Ranch I, the easement was granted just two days before the agreement execution, prompting us to recall Maxwell Smart’s famous line.

Given the Court’s determination on entrepreneurial risk, there was no need to parse the specific facts and circumstances of these transfers, or whether the five factors identified by the court were enough to warrant disguised sale treatment. It leaves open the question whether similar, or even slightly different, facts and circumstances would be sufficient to find a disguised sale. We don’t know. But with time, and another case, there’s a fair chance we will.

Tax Court Denies Texas Conservation Easement

Last week we wrote about the Tax Court’s application of Belk v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 1 (2013) in the Bosque Canyon Ranch case. Here’s a more detailed description of the case.

BCRBosque Canyon Ranch (“BCR”) is a 3,729 acre-tract in Bosque County, Texas. Petitioners formed BCR I, a Texas limited partnership, in July 2003. BCR I made $2.2 million in improvements to BC Ranch between 2003 and 2005.

In 2004, BCR I began marketing limited partnership interest (“LP units”) at $350,000 per unit. Each purchaser would become a limited partner in BCR I and the partnership would subsequently distribute a fee simple interest in a five-acre parcel of property (the “Homesite parcel”) to that limited partner. Each Homesite Parcel owner had the right to build a house on the parcel and use BC Ranch for various activities. The distribution of Homesite Parcels was conditioned on BCR I granting a conservation easement to the North American Land Trust (“NALT”) for 1,750 acres of BC Ranch.

BCR I granted the conservation easement to NALT on December 29, 2005.  The land subject to the conservation easement could not be used for residential, commercial, institutional, industrial, or agricultural purposes. BCR I had 24 LP purchasers in 2005 with payments totaling $8,400,000. BCR I obtained a certified appraisal report effective November 28, 2005, valuing the conservation easement at $8,400,000.

BCR II was formed in December 2005 as a Texas limited partnership and BCR I deeded 1,866 acres of BC Ranch to BCR II.  In 2006, BCR II began marketing Homesite parcels with offering documents were substantially similar to that of BCR I. BCR II granted NALT a conservation easement on September 14, 2007.  BCR II collected payments of $9,957,500 from 23 purchasers and obtained an appraisal valuing the 2007 easement at $7,500,000.

After all of the transfers, the 47 limited partners of BCR I and BCR II owned approximately 235 acres and 3,482 of the remaining 3,509 acres were subject to the 2005 and 2007 NALT easements.

Procedural History

BCR I filed a 2005 Form 1065 reporting capital contributions of $8,400,000 and claiming an $8,400,000 charitable contribution deduction related to the 2005 NALT easement. The IRS sent petitioner a 2005 FPAA on December 29, 2008, determining that BCR I was not entitled to a charitable contribution deduction. The IRS also determined that petitioners were subject to either accuracy-related or gross valuation misstatement penalties. IRS counsel submitted an amended answer on April 26, 2010, contending that the BCR I transactions at issue were sales of real property.

BCR II filed a 2007 Form 1065 reporting capital contributions of $9,956,500 and claiming an $7,500,000 charitable contribution deduction related to the 2007 NALT easement. The IRS sent petitioner a 2007 FPAA on August 23, 2011, determining that BCR II was not entitled to a charitable contribution deduction and that petitioners were subject to either accuracy-related or gross valuation misstatement penalties. IRS counsel did not allege that the BCR II transactions were sales of real property. The Court consolidated petitioners’ cases for trial.

Charitable Contribution Deductions

The Homesite parcel owners and the NALT could, by mutual agreement, modify the Homesite boundaries. The deed forbids a decrease in “the overall property subject to the easement” and changes in the “exterior boundaries of the property subject to the easement.” The deed also provides that the boundary changes only occur between unburdened parcels (the Homesite lots).

The Court found that the property protected by the 2005 and 2007 easements could lose this protection as a result of boundary modifications allowed after the easements were granted. Citing Belk v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 1 (2013), the Court held that the restrictions were not granted in perpetuity as required under IRC § 170(h)(2)(C) because the 2005 and 2007 deeds allow modifications between the Homesite parcels and the property subject to the easements. Thus, the easements are not qualified real property interests required under IRC § 170(h)(1)(A). (There are some distinct factual differences from Belk that we noted in an earlier post found here).

Judge Foley also took issue with the lack of documentation establishing the condition of the property provided by petitioners to NALT as required by Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i). The Court found that the documentation was “unreliable, incomplete, and insufficient to establish the condition of the relevant property on the date the respective easements were granted.”

Disguised Sale

Judge Foley found that the partnerships deeded the Homesite properties to the limited partners within five months of the limited partners’ payments for the property. Under Treas. Reg. 1.707-3(c)(1) and 1.707-6(a) transfers between a partnership and a partner within a two-year period are presumed to be a sale of the property to the partner unless the facts and circumstances clearly establish that the transfers do not constitute a sale.

Petitioners argued that the partners’ payments would be at risk, pursuant to the terms of the LP agreements, if the easements were not granted. The Court rejected this argument based on its finding that the 2005 and 2007 easements were granted prior to the execution of the BCR I and BCR II LP agreements, respectively.  Thus, the Court held that BCR I and BCR II were required to recognize income on any gains related to the 24 and 23 disguised sales by each limited partnership, respectively.

Gross Valuation Misstatement Penalties

Judge Foley held that the petitioners were liable for a 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty under IRC § 6662(h). Petitioner’s argued that they acted reasonably and in good faith by procuring a qualified appraisal from a qualified appraiser and by relying on a memorandum from their CPA.  Judge Foley found that while these actions constituted a good faith investigation of the easement’s value, BCR I did not provide NALT with sufficient documentation of the condition of the property being donated and affirmed the 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty against BCR I for 2005.

For returns filed after August 17, 2006, the gross valuation misstatement penalty is modified by Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(g) when the determined value of the property is zero and the value claimed is greater than zero. Additionally, taxpayers who file returns after 2006 can no longer claim a reasonable cause defense for gross valuation misstatements relating to charitable contribution deductions. (Though reasonable cause is still a valid defense for substantial valuation misstatements. See, IRC § 6664(c)(3).) Thus, the Court held that BCR II is liable for the 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty relating to the 2007 tax year.

Read the full opinion here: Bosque Canyon Ranch L.P., v. Commissioner, TC-Memo. 2015-130