Tax Court Reasserts Position on Conservation Easements

Opining on a motion for reconsideration, the Tax Court has reaffirmed the circumstances under which a conservation easement might be extinguished without violating the regulatory requirement that the donation be made in perpetuity. Asked to account for an intervening change in the law based on First Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Kaufman v. Shulman, the Court declined to change its earlier decision in Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1.

In the matter under reconsideration, the parties reserved the right to extinguish the conservation easement by mutual agreement. Under those circumstances, the donee organization would have received its proportionate share of the proceeds following removal of the easement. The taxpayers argued that these circumstances met the in perpetuity “safe harbor” under Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.170A- 14(g)(6)(i) for terminated conservation easements.

The Court disagreed and emphasized that “extinguishment by judicial proceedings is necessary” to satisfy the regulation and that a proportionate share reserved for the donee organization is not an adequate substitute for guaranteeing the donation in perpetuity. The Court also reminded the taxpayers that in cases appealable to Federal Courts of Appeals that had not ruled on the issue – as was the case here – the First Circuit’s decision is not binding on the Tax Court.

Read the entire opinion here:
Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-172

Government Denied Summary Judgment in Conservation Easement Case

white-cloud-wilderness-idahoThe U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho recently rejected the government’s pre-trial motion for summary judgment on the validity of a conservation easement donation, setting the stage for a trial on the facts of the transaction.

The District Court’s order and decision provides another ray of hope for Alan Pesky’s efforts to preserve his charitable contribution deduction for the conservation easement donation he made in 2002. Mr. Pesky has already been through a series of pre-trial motions. While this decision should have him headed for trial on the merits of the tax deductions for his donation, as we note below, the government has lobbed yet another missive over the transom.

The facts of the Pesky case are complicated but not necessarily unusual among high-net worth individuals with substantial real estate holdings who find themselves approached about a conservation easement donation. In stark summary, Alan Pesky was approached by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) to acquire a parcel over which a conservation easement ultimately was granted to TNC. The acquisition involved a series of negotiations and collateral agreements which may or may not prove to be relevant in sustaining the deduction.

When the donation was complete, Mr. Pesky deducted a portion of the conservation easement donation on his 2002 tax return and carried forward the remainder on his 2003 and 2004 returns. The government has challenged the charitable deductions for all three years but had to assert fraud for the 2002 tax year because it failed to issue a notice of deficiency within the three-year statute of limitations. The government made additional assertions of fraud which were addressed in this order (and elsewhere).

This case is a fine example of the Government’s recent approach to conservation easement litigation. The government wants to win early dismissal of these cases on pre-trials motions without allowing an examination of the facts and is willing to renew and recycle arguments that have failed before and been flat out rejected in other Federal circuits.

The government moved for summary judgment based on three primary arguments. The first argument was that the conservation easement was part of a larger quid pro quo transaction between the taxpayers and TNC.  This argument has been considered in this context by the Tax Court in at least one reported decision but under substantially different facts than these.  Considering the factors that might influence a jury on this question, the U.S. District Court ruled that a genuine issue of material fact remained for consideration at trial and denied the government’s motion.

The government’s second argument was that there was no contemporaneous written acknowledgement of goods and services received. Though the government conceded the existence of such an acknowledgment, its argument was an extension of the quid pro quo position, i.e., that there was no charitable intent. The court also rejected the argument based on the potential for a genuine issue of material fact.  One might argue though that the taxpayer should prevail based on the substantial compliance doctrine adopted in Simmons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2009-208 aff’d. 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

Finally, the government argued that donation should fail because the Pesky’s property appraisal did not meet the standard for a qualified appraisal standard in the regulations. Again, the District Court leaned on potential for a genuine issue of material facts to deny the government’s motion.  Given the minimum threshold standard for a qualified appraisal set forth by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012), the taxpayers should also prevail on this issue.

In all events, the court rejected all three of the government’s arguments.  The persistence of the government, however, should not be denied. Despite the court’s rejection of their positions just last Monday, the government had already filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on Friday requesting that the court take yet another look at these well-worn arguments.  The Pesky’s might yet have their day in court, but not before they cross a few more hurdles the government intends to through in the way.

Read the Order Denying the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgement here:
Pesky Order 7.8.13

Read the Government’s Motion for Reconsideration here:
Pesky Motion for Reconsideration 7.12.13

Tax Court: Side Letter Invalidates Facade Easement Donation

tread_HDIn a division opinion that reflects the increasingly technical aspects of defending conservation easement cases, the Tax Court has disallowed deductions for the contribution of cash and a façade easement to a qualified organization.  The charitable contributions were disallowed because the donee issued a “side letter” promising to refund cash contributions and rescind the easement over the donor’s property if the donation was “disallowed” by the Internal Revenue Service.

The taxpayers donated a façade easement over their home in the Treadwell Farms Historic District on the Upper East Side of Manhattan. They obtained a qualified appraisal and took deductions based on their cash contributions and the value of the donated easement. The entire transaction was covered by the side letter. The IRS disallowed the deductions for the cash and easement donations and imposed penalties. The taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court.

The case was submitted to the Court without trial on stipulated facts. The Court found that the promises in the comfort letter made the gifts conditional and thus incomplete for purposes of the deduction. It found that the possibility that the IRS would disallow the contributions was not “so remote as to be negligible” – a standard imposed under the regulations governing the deductibility of conservation easements. The Court noted IRS administrative guidance issued prior to the donation announcing increased scrutiny of somewhat similar transactions and the donee organization’s “standard policy” to refund contributions for challenged transactions as evidence that an IRS disallowance was not “so remote as to be negligible.” The Court did not address the penalties, reserving that issue for future proceedings.

Read the entire opinion here:
Graev v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. No. 17 (2013)

Value Matters, Even as Tax Court Denies Conservation Easement Deduction

Autosave-File vom d-lab2/3 der AgfaPhoto GmbHAlthough disappointing to the petitioning taxpayer, yesterday’s Tax Court opinion in Mountanos v. Commissioner is of some relief to practitioners and counsel who follow conservation easement cases closely. Recent decisions in the Tax Court (Belk, Averyt) and the Courts of Appeals (Kaufman, Scheidelman) have turned on technical aspects of the Treasury regulations that govern the deductibility of these charitable contributions.

Mountanos, instead, is a “traditional” conservation easement case in that the validity of the donation, documentation and recordation of the easement were not at issue. We note, however, that the government did argue that the taxpayers did not acquire a “contemporaneous written acknowledgment” from the donee organization or a “qualified appraisal” as required under the applicable statute and regulations but the court did not address these arguments.

Rather this case turned entirely on the value attributed to the taxpayer’s donation of an 882 acre tract of undeveloped land in north central California. The taxpayer’s valuation was based on the before and after approach. Using that method, where the “before” value is based on the highest and best use of the property, the taxpayer’s $4.6 million valuation was based on use of the property as part vineyard and part residential development. The “after” valuation – that is, after the restrictive easement was imposed – was based entirely on recreational use (such as deer hunting).

Judge Kroupa was not persuaded that a 287 acre vineyard “was a legally permissible, physically possible and economically feasible use of the ranch.” The taxpayer’s restricted access to the property (across Federally controlled parkland) and lack of access to proper irrigation made the likelihood of a viable vineyard slim, even if it could have been economically viable (which the court found equally unlikely).

The proposed use of the property for residential development was no more impressive to the court. The entire parcel was subject to a contract with the county, governed by a state statute (the Williamson Act), that forbade residential development – even before the conservation easement donation had been made. The taxpayers did not put on evidence to convince the court that the state law restrictions would not apply if the taxpayer indeed tried to pursue residential development. Accordingly, the court concluded that the taxpayers failed to show that “the conservation easement had any value.”

The court also sustained the 40% gross valuation overstatement penalty asserted against the taxpayers. It is unclear whether the taxpayers put forth a reasonable cause defense to the penalty or not but the court noted that such a defense does not apply “in the case of a gross valuation overstatement with respect to property for which a charitable contribution deduction was claimed under section 170. Sec. 6664(c)(3).”

This was unquestionably a bad result for the taxpayers but still an encouraging note for taxpayers who have made carefully executed and fairly valued conservation or facade easements – you should at least have a day in court.

Read the opinion here:
Mountanos v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2013-138

Conservation Easement Deduction Denied as Quid Pro Quo for Subdivision Approval

The Tax Court denied the taxpayers’ deduction for the donation of a conservation easement where the taxpayer granted the easement pursuant to negotiations with a local zoning authority for approval of a subdivision exemption.

The deductibility of conservation easement donations is drawn from the general rule allowing the deduction of charitable contributions under IRC §170. Charitable contributions must be freely given, i.e., a gift, to qualify for the deduction. If the contribution is made in exchange for a specific benefit, i.e., a quid pro quo, then it does not qualify for the deduction.

The Tax Court found that the taxpayer’s donation of the easement was not a gift because it was “part of a quid pro quo exchange for Boulder County’s approving his subdivision exemption request.” The court also approved the application of the 20% substantial understatement penalty under IRC §6662(b)(2) against the taxpayer. The court denied the taxpayer’s reasonable cause argument to avoid the penalty, specifically noting the lack of testimony from the CPA who prepared the returns and invoking the “Wichita Terminal rule” to find for the government. The Wichita Terminal rule is drawn from a 67 year-old Tax Court case and generally provides that when a litigant fails to produce the testimony of a person that might be expected to testify, that failure gives rise to a presumption that the testimony would be unfavorable to the litigant’s case.

While the taxpayer lost on the 20% penalty, the court did reject the government’s argument for the 40% gross valuation penalty under IRC §6662(h)(2). In support of its position the commissioner alleged that the appraisal:

(1) was made more than 60 days before the grant of the second conservation easement; (2) does not describe the property; (3) does not contain the expected date of contribution; (4) does not contain the terms of the second conservation easement; (5) does not include the appraised fair market value of the second conservation easement on the expected date of contribution; and (6) does not provide the method of valuation Mr. Roberts used in that the report does not adequately identify the highest and best use of the property.

The taxpayer urged that the penalty did not apply under the exception provided in IRC §6664(c)(2) because the taxpayer obtained a “qualified appraisal” from a “qualified appraiser” and made a good faith investigation of the value of the property before making the donation. The court sided with the taxpayer and rejected the government’s arguments. The court voiced its particular concern with the government’s claim that the appraisal was not qualified because did not provide a method of valuation. The court noted that the appraisal specifically identified the well-established “before and after” valuation method and repeated, though without citation, the same concerns expressed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Scheidleman v. Commissioner, that is, that the government’s claim really was directed at the reliability of the report and not its validity or “qualification”.

Read the entire opinion here:
Pollard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2013-38

Tax Court Denies Conservation Easement that Allowed Substitution of Property

us_tax_courtAs the IRS continues to challenge charitable deductions for the contribution of conservation and facade easements, the Tax Court is considering the details of these arrangements with greater scrutiny. In doing so, the Court is refining the law governing these transactions. In its most recent opinion on this issue, the Court clarified yet another requirement for taxpayers who wish to claim this charitable deduction.

In Belk v. Commissioner, the taxpayers donated a conservation easement over a 184 acre golf course and claimed a $10.5 million deduction on their 2004 tax return. The conservation easement agreement executed by the parties included a provision which allowed the owner of the property (i.e., the taxpayers) to substitute the property subject to the easement with “an area of land owned by Owner which is contiguous to the Conservation Area for an equal or lesser area of land comprising a portion of the Conservation Area.”

The IRS challenged the validity of the entire donation on the grounds that the real property interest (i.e., the golf course) was not donated in perpetuity because the substitution provision allowed it to be replaced by another property. The IRS argued that the substitution provision violated the requirement that the contribution be an interest in real property that is subject to a use restriction granted in perpetuity under IRC §170(h)(2)(C).

The IRS previously had argued that certain facade easements violated the “in perpetuity” requirement. See, Kaufman v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 182 (2010) (Kaufman I) and Kaufman v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (2011) (Kaufman II). The Kaufman argument, however, was based on the language of IRC §170(h)(5) which requires that the conservation purpose of the easement be protected in perpetuity. Though the IRS prevailed in the Tax Court, Kaufman and the §170(h)(5) argument was overturned by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Kaufman v. Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012).

In Belk, the IRS, and apparently the taxpayers (see footnote 17), combined the two provisions of §170 while making the perpetuity argument. Judge Vasquez, writing for the Court, parsed the issue more carefully. He noted that §170(h)(2)(C) requires that the property must be subject to a perpetual restriction on use as distinguished from § 170(h)(5) which requires that the conservation purpose be protected in perpetuity. The Court made it clear that the two provisions were separate and distinct and based its decision on the former.

The Court held that the donation made by the Belk’s did not constitute a “qualified real property interest” under §170(h)(2)(C) because the conservation easement agreement allowed for substitution of the contributed property. The court found that the contributed property was not subject to a use restriction in perpetuity but in fact subject to the restriction only so long as the substitution provision in the agreement was not exercised. Accordingly, the charitable donation did not meet the requirements of §170(h) and the deduction was denied in full. The Court did not reach the question of conservation purpose or valuation.

Read the entire opinion here:
Belk v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. No. 1 (2013)

1st Circuit Vacates Tax Court on Historical Facade Conservation Easement

In a case that has been followed closely by many interested parties, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the taxpayers and the validity of their charitable contribution of an historical façade conservation easement in Kaufman v. Shulman. The 1st Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s legal ruling on partial summary judgment and remanded the matter for further findings on the questions of penalties and valuation.

The taxpayers in Kaufman owned an approximately 150 year-old row house in the historic district of South End in Boston. The home reflected mid-nineteenth century architecture and included a unique Venetian-Gothic style façade. In 2003, the taxpayers executed a “Preservation Restriction Agreement” donating an easement over the property to a qualified charitable organization for the purpose of protecting and preserving the historical features of the home. On the advice of the donee, the taxpayers obtained an appraisal of the contribution from an experienced appraiser who valued the easement at $220,800. The taxpayers took deductions on their 2003 and 2004 tax returns for the value of the donated easement, subject to the limits of IRC Sec. 170(b)(1)(E).

The property was subject to a mortgage when the taxpayers made the donation. The taxpayers obtained an agreement from the lender subordinating certain of the mortgage-holder’s rights in the property to the donee in accordance with the regulations governing the charitable donation of conservation easements. The agreement included several restrictive clauses, one of which became the focus of the Tax Court’s determination and the 1st Circuit’s ruling. That clause read as follows:

The Mortgagee/Lender and its assignees shall have a prior claim to all insurance proceeds as a result of any casualty, hazard or accident occurring to or about the Property and all proceeds of condemnation, and shall be entitled to same in preference to Grantee until the Mortgage is paid off and discharged, notwithstanding that the Mortgage is subordinate in priority to the [Preservation Restriction] Agreement.

Following an examination of their 2003 and 2004 returns, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency to the Kaufmans disallowing the deductions for the charitable contribution of the easement. The IRS maintained that the donation did not meet the regulatory requirements of Section 170(h). The taxpayers petitioned the U.S. Tax Court.

The Tax Court, in a division opinion by Judge Halpern, ruled for the IRS on a motion for partial summary judgment. Kaufman v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 182 (2010). The Tax Court held that the conservation easement as executed failed to satisfy the requirement of Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.170A-14(g)(6). The Tax Court’s position on summary judgment, as summarized by the First Circuit, was that

although the Kaufmans in the Preservation Restriction Agreement governing 19 Rutland Square granted the Trust an entitlement to a proportionate share of post-extinguishment proceeds, thus seemingly complying with the regulation, the lender agreement executed by Washington Mutual undercut this commitment–and so defeated the deduction–by stipulating that “[t]he Mortgagee/Lender and its assignees shall have a prior claim to all insurance proceeds . . . and all proceeds of condemnation, and shall be entitled to same in preference to Grantee until the Mortgage is paid off and discharged.”

Even though the Tax Court decided for the government “entirely” on the basis of Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.170A-14(g)(6), the Court of Appeals also addressed paragraphs (g)(1) (perpetuity), (g)(2) (remote events), and g(3) (subordination) of the regulation in its opinion. The First Circuit observed that the IRS’s arguments in support of the Tax Court’s decision under g(6) would “appear to doom practically all donations of easements, which is surely contrary to the purpose of Congress.” The appellate court continued that it “cannot find reasonable an impromptu reading [of a regulation] that is not compelled and would defeat the purpose of the statute, as we think is the case here.” So on the big issue in the case, whether the mortgage subordination clause that granted the lender a prior claim to insurance and condemnation proceeds defeated the deduction, the First Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s legal conclusion.

The First Circuit made clear that it did not rest its decision on either the application of paragraphs (g)(3), addressing the defeasance of the deduction by remote future events, or (g)(2) which the taxpayers argued would have upheld the subordination agreement regardless of the extinguishment provision. This caveat seems to preserve the Tax Court’s recent opinion in Mitchell v. Commissioner from the scope of this ruling.

The appellate panel also addressed the “in perpetuity” requirement of Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.170A-14(g)(1) and the language in the agreement stating that “nothing herein contained shall be construed to limit the [Trust’s] right to give its consent (e.g., to changes in the façade) or to abandon some or all of its rights hereunder.” The First Circuit noted its agreement with the D.C. Circuit who decided the same issue in Commissioner v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) and added that the question was not whether the paragraph was a reasonable interpretation of the underlying statute, Sec. 170(h)(5), but whether the IRS’s interpretation of the regulation was reasonable. The court concluded that the regulation did not support the IRS’s stringent view.

Read the entire opinion here:
Kaufman v. Shulman, Docket No. 11-2017P-01A (1st Cir., July 19, 2012)

WSJ: IRS Drops NYSE Executive Compensation Case

The March 2 print edition of the Wall Street Journal reports that the IRS has abandoned its effort to disallow $161 million of deductions taken by the New York Stock Exchange for compensation paid to former CEO Richard Grasso.

In 2003, Richard Grasso resigned under controversy when his massive pay package of the then not-for-profit NYSE was made public.  A number of legal actions ensued including an IRS examination of the stock exchange.  Under audit, the IRS disallowed approximately $161 million of deductions taken for compensation allocated to the former executive between 2001 and 2003.

In 2009, the NYSE challenged the government’s determination and submitted its protest to the IRS Office of Appeals.  The Wall Street Journal reports that after two years in the appeals process, in November of 2011 the IRS concluded that there was no tax deficiency for the challenged years and ultimately resolved the matter in favor of the NYSE.

Tax Court: Non-Profit Not Subject to Excise Tax on Plan Reversion

The United States Tax Court, in a division opinion authored by Judge Haines, found that a non-profit organization, Research Corporation, was not subject to excise tax under Section 4980 on a $4.4 million reversion from a defined benefit retirement plan. The court held that Research Corporation was never subject to tax under subtitle A and the plan was not a qualified plan subject to the excise tax. The court also held that it did not have jurisdiction to issue a refund for excise taxes already paid.

Read the opinion here:
Research Corporation v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 7 (2012)