Tag Archives: Tax Court

Value Matters, Even as Tax Court Denies Conservation Easement Deduction

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Autosave-File vom d-lab2/3 der AgfaPhoto GmbHAlthough disappointing to the petitioning taxpayer, yesterday’s Tax Court opinion in Mountanos v. Commissioner is of some relief to practitioners and counsel who follow conservation easement cases closely. Recent decisions in the Tax Court (Belk, Averyt) and the Courts of Appeals (Kaufman, Scheidelman) have turned on technical aspects of the Treasury regulations that govern the deductibility of these charitable contributions.

Mountanos, instead, is a “traditional” conservation easement case in that the validity of the donation, documentation and recordation of the easement were not at issue. We note, however, that the government did argue that the taxpayers did not acquire a “contemporaneous written acknowledgment” from the donee organization or a “qualified appraisal” as required under the applicable statute and regulations but the court did not address these arguments.

Rather this case turned entirely on the value attributed to the taxpayer’s donation of an 882 acre tract of undeveloped land in north central California. The taxpayer’s valuation was based on the before and after approach. Using that method, where the “before” value is based on the highest and best use of the property, the taxpayer’s $4.6 million valuation was based on use of the property as part vineyard and part residential development. The “after” valuation – that is, after the restrictive easement was imposed – was based entirely on recreational use (such as deer hunting).

Judge Kroupa was not persuaded that a 287 acre vineyard “was a legally permissible, physically possible and economically feasible use of the ranch.” The taxpayer’s restricted access to the property (across Federally controlled parkland) and lack of access to proper irrigation made the likelihood of a viable vineyard slim, even if it could have been economically viable (which the court found equally unlikely).

The proposed use of the property for residential development was no more impressive to the court. The entire parcel was subject to a contract with the county, governed by a state statute (the Williamson Act), that forbade residential development – even before the conservation easement donation had been made. The taxpayers did not put on evidence to convince the court that the state law restrictions would not apply if the taxpayer indeed tried to pursue residential development. Accordingly, the court concluded that the taxpayers failed to show that “the conservation easement had any value.”

The court also sustained the 40% gross valuation overstatement penalty asserted against the taxpayers. It is unclear whether the taxpayers put forth a reasonable cause defense to the penalty or not but the court noted that such a defense does not apply “in the case of a gross valuation overstatement with respect to property for which a charitable contribution deduction was claimed under section 170. Sec. 6664(c)(3).”

This was unquestionably a bad result for the taxpayers but still an encouraging note for taxpayers who have made carefully executed and fairly valued conservation or facade easements – you should at least have a day in court.

Read the opinion here:
Mountanos v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2013-138

Tax Court: Challenge to Underlying Liability Does Not Extend Period for CDP Appeal

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In a rare division opinion supplementing a previous division opinion, the Tax Court offers a primer on the definition of “deficiency” and its meaning for jurisdictional purposes. This opinion is not for the meek of heart nor for those not ready to tackle the nuance of Tax Court jurisdiction.

In response to a motion to certify an interlocutory appeal, Judge Joseph Gale lays out the statutory requirements for the court’s jurisdiction over deficiencies as well as collection actions. He also discusses the statutory grounds for variances in the 30-day response required for collection due process review (e.g., innocent spouse relief, interest abatement) and other non-deficiency actions (e.g., employment taxes, frivolous return penalties) in U.S. Tax Court.

The court did not certify the interlocutory appeal and affirmed the proposition that a challenge to the “underlying tax liability” in a collection due process hearing does not extend the period in which to file a petition for review with the Tax Court.

Read the entire opinion here:
Gray v. Commissioner (Gray II), 140 T.C. No. 9 (2013)

Tax Court: Second FPAA Invalid, Cannot Confer Jurisdiction

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us_tax_courtIn Wise Guys Holdings v. Commissioner, the Tax Court has ruled that a second Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) issued to the same Tax Matters Partner for the same tax period is invalid where the issuance was not a result of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of material fact. The invalid FPAA cannot confer jurisdiction on the court in a TEFRA action where neither the Tax Matters Partner nor a notice partner filed a timely petition in response to the first FPAA. The petition was dismissed.

Find out why the Wise Guys lost their bet on the second FPAA here:
Wise Guys Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. No. 8 (2013)

Tax Court: Horse Breeding Activity Not Motivated By Profit, Losses Disallowed

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Horse FarmIn a memorandum opinion, the Tax Court has held that a taxpayer’s 17 years of losses in the horse-breeding business was not an activity motivated by profit under IRC §183. The taxpayer’s deductions attributable to the activity were disallowed and a substantial underpayment penalty was imposed.

Read the opinion here:
Dodds v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-76

Second Circuit: Co-Op Owner Is Entitled to Casualty Loss

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circseal2The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed the Tax Court’s decision that a New York City co-op owner, Ms. Alphonso, could not deduct casualty losses that occurred on grounds owned in common with other cooperative shareholders.

The Tax Court held that Ms. Alphonso could not take a deduction for a casualty loss because she did not hold a property interest in the damaged property. The damage in question occurred when a retaining wall along the common property of the cooperative apartment building collapsed. The co-op shareholders contributed to the necessary repairs and clean-up. Ms. Alphonso took a deduction of about $23,000 for her share of the repairs, claiming that it qualified as a casualty loss under under IRC §165(c)(3).

The Tax Court did not address the merits of the casualty loss claim. Rather, the Court ruled as a matter of law that Ms. Alphonso did not hold a “sufficient” property interest in the common area of the apartment building to qualify for the deduction.

The Second Circuit vacated the Tax Court holding that although Ms. Alphonso’s interest in the damaged common area was not exclusive with respect to her fellow tenant shareholders it was still a property right. Thus, the “property” element of section 165(c)(3) was satisfied. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court for further proceedings on whether the claimed damages qualified as a casualty loss.

Read the Second Circuit’s opinion here:
Alphonso v. Commissioner, No. 11-2364 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2013)

Read the Tax Court opinion here.

Conservation Easement Deduction Denied as Quid Pro Quo for Subdivision Approval

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The Tax Court denied the taxpayers’ deduction for the donation of a conservation easement where the taxpayer granted the easement pursuant to negotiations with a local zoning authority for approval of a subdivision exemption.

The deductibility of conservation easement donations is drawn from the general rule allowing the deduction of charitable contributions under IRC §170. Charitable contributions must be freely given, i.e., a gift, to qualify for the deduction. If the contribution is made in exchange for a specific benefit, i.e., a quid pro quo, then it does not qualify for the deduction.

The Tax Court found that the taxpayer’s donation of the easement was not a gift because it was “part of a quid pro quo exchange for Boulder County’s approving his subdivision exemption request.” The court also approved the application of the 20% substantial understatement penalty under IRC §6662(b)(2) against the taxpayer. The court denied the taxpayer’s reasonable cause argument to avoid the penalty, specifically noting the lack of testimony from the CPA who prepared the returns and invoking the “Wichita Terminal rule” to find for the government. The Wichita Terminal rule is drawn from a 67 year-old Tax Court case and generally provides that when a litigant fails to produce the testimony of a person that might be expected to testify, that failure gives rise to a presumption that the testimony would be unfavorable to the litigant’s case.

While the taxpayer lost on the 20% penalty, the court did reject the government’s argument for the 40% gross valuation penalty under IRC §6662(h)(2). In support of its position the commissioner alleged that the appraisal:

(1) was made more than 60 days before the grant of the second conservation easement; (2) does not describe the property; (3) does not contain the expected date of contribution; (4) does not contain the terms of the second conservation easement; (5) does not include the appraised fair market value of the second conservation easement on the expected date of contribution; and (6) does not provide the method of valuation Mr. Roberts used in that the report does not adequately identify the highest and best use of the property.

The taxpayer urged that the penalty did not apply under the exception provided in IRC §6664(c)(2) because the taxpayer obtained a “qualified appraisal” from a “qualified appraiser” and made a good faith investigation of the value of the property before making the donation. The court sided with the taxpayer and rejected the government’s arguments. The court voiced its particular concern with the government’s claim that the appraisal was not qualified because did not provide a method of valuation. The court noted that the appraisal specifically identified the well-established “before and after” valuation method and repeated, though without citation, the same concerns expressed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Scheidleman v. Commissioner, that is, that the government’s claim really was directed at the reliability of the report and not its validity or “qualification”.

Read the entire opinion here:
Pollard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2013-38

Tax Court Denies Conservation Easement that Allowed Substitution of Property

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us_tax_courtAs the IRS continues to challenge charitable deductions for the contribution of conservation and facade easements, the Tax Court is considering the details of these arrangements with greater scrutiny. In doing so, the Court is refining the law governing these transactions. In its most recent opinion on this issue, the Court clarified yet another requirement for taxpayers who wish to claim this charitable deduction.

In Belk v. Commissioner, the taxpayers donated a conservation easement over a 184 acre golf course and claimed a $10.5 million deduction on their 2004 tax return. The conservation easement agreement executed by the parties included a provision which allowed the owner of the property (i.e., the taxpayers) to substitute the property subject to the easement with “an area of land owned by Owner which is contiguous to the Conservation Area for an equal or lesser area of land comprising a portion of the Conservation Area.”

The IRS challenged the validity of the entire donation on the grounds that the real property interest (i.e., the golf course) was not donated in perpetuity because the substitution provision allowed it to be replaced by another property. The IRS argued that the substitution provision violated the requirement that the contribution be an interest in real property that is subject to a use restriction granted in perpetuity under IRC §170(h)(2)(C).

The IRS previously had argued that certain facade easements violated the “in perpetuity” requirement. See, Kaufman v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 182 (2010) (Kaufman I) and Kaufman v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (2011) (Kaufman II). The Kaufman argument, however, was based on the language of IRC §170(h)(5) which requires that the conservation purpose of the easement be protected in perpetuity. Though the IRS prevailed in the Tax Court, Kaufman and the §170(h)(5) argument was overturned by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Kaufman v. Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012).

In Belk, the IRS, and apparently the taxpayers (see footnote 17), combined the two provisions of §170 while making the perpetuity argument. Judge Vasquez, writing for the Court, parsed the issue more carefully. He noted that §170(h)(2)(C) requires that the property must be subject to a perpetual restriction on use as distinguished from § 170(h)(5) which requires that the conservation purpose be protected in perpetuity. The Court made it clear that the two provisions were separate and distinct and based its decision on the former.

The Court held that the donation made by the Belk’s did not constitute a “qualified real property interest” under §170(h)(2)(C) because the conservation easement agreement allowed for substitution of the contributed property. The court found that the contributed property was not subject to a use restriction in perpetuity but in fact subject to the restriction only so long as the substitution provision in the agreement was not exercised. Accordingly, the charitable donation did not meet the requirements of §170(h) and the deduction was denied in full. The Court did not reach the question of conservation purpose or valuation.

Read the entire opinion here:
Belk v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. No. 1 (2013)

Tax Court: Legal Fees Not Deductible for Conduct of S Corp. Sole Shareholder

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The Tax Court has denied the deductibility of legal fees incurred to defend a wrongful death suit brought against the sole shareholder of an S Corp. Authored by Judge Holmes in inimitable style, the opinion offers a good discussion of the various instances when a corporation can, and cannot, deduct legal fees incurred on behalf of its employees.

Read the opinion here:
Cavanaugh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-324

Tax Court: Deed Is Substantiation of Conservation Easement Donation

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The Tax Court continues to define the limits on the charitable donation of conservation easements while the IRS maintains its frontal assault on these transactions. In Averyt v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered respondent’s motion for summary judgment and petitioner’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the question of whether or not the timely recorded deed of conservation easement satisfied the substantiation requirements of IRC Sec. 170(f)(8).

IRC Sec. 170(f)(8) generally requires that a charitable contribution of $250 or more must be substantiated with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the donee organization. A written acknowledgement must include

(i) the amount of cash and a description (but not value) of any property other than cash contributed; (ii) whether the donee organization provided any goods or services in consideration, in whole or in part, for any property; and (iii) a description and good faith estimate of the value of any goods or services.

The IRS argued that, as a matter of law, the taxpayers had not met the substantiation requirements of Section 170(f)(8). The taxpayers argued that the conservation deed was a contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the charitable contribution that satisfied Section 170(f)(8).

The Commissioner relied on Schrimsher v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-71, where the court held that the contribution of a conservation easement was not deductible because the taxpayers did not receive a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the donee organization. The taxpayers in Schrimsher relied on the conservation deed as evidence that the donee acknowledged the donation. The deed recited consideration of “the sum of TEN DOLLARS, plus other good and valuable consideration.” The Court held that the deed did not meet two of the three requirements of Section 170(f)(8) because it did not describe the property donated or provide a good faith estimate of its value.

The deed recorded in this case, however, recited consideration more particularly. The conservation easement in Averyt was granted “in consideration of the foregoing recitations and of the mutual covenants, terms, conditions, and restrictions hereinunder set forth.” The Court found that the deed language in this case compared favorably with the deed in Simmons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-208, aff’d, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) where the Court held that the deed satisfied the Sec. 170(f)(8) substantiation requirements. Accordingly, the Court found that the deed in this case met all of the requirements of Section 170(f)(8) including the provision that no goods or services were received in exchange for the donation.

The Court granted petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment. The Court also determined that material questions of fact remained with regard to the other issues in dispute, so a trial may be forthcoming to determine those facts.

Read the opinion here:
Averyt v. Commissioner, TC Memo. 2012-198